
Originally Posted by
bilby
Memories are the self, and the self is memories. If you are placed in a coma and wake with complete amnesia, then you died, and the person who woke is a new person, who just happens to be using the same body and brain as his support system that you once used.
Consciousness is simply immediate term memory. To discuss the 'self' in the context of complete amnesia is meaningless.
That's one option to take, but it strikes me as counterintuitive when you deconstruct it. What about cases of memory loss that is reversed? When previously forgotten memories resurface or are otherwise restored, does their restoration
make them my memories, when beforehand they were those of "a new person"? What happens to this other person when my memories return and are re-integrated into my own consciousness? I think it's more straightforwardly coherent to instead say that remembering what was once forgotten
reveals them as having
always been my memories, my experiences
when they occurred.
Another way to argue this is to think of the following prospect: tomorrow, I will administer a drug to you, bilby, that will give you total amnesia for a temporary period of time. During that time, I will perform unspeakable torture on your body (or the body of this "new person" you refer to). When I'm done, the effects of the drug will wear off, and all memory of the torture will fade with the drug as it leaves your system. Assume no lasting physical damage will be recorded as aches or scars--if you like, it would be a direct cranial stimulation of your pain receptors.
If you're right, you should regard this proposal as an unfortunate occurrence for that "new person", in the same way you'd view the news of a torture victim being found in some person's basement. Poor guy, but better him than me, right? Somehow, I don't think you'd feel this way about the situation, though. You would look upon the next 48 hours with the dread of
being he who undergoes first the disorienting confusion of memory loss followed by the agony of torture, and knowing that both experiences would in a sense be isolated from your current self due to the lack of memory connections would not remove this feeling of anticipation. Am I wrong?