I believe mathematical logic is wrong. I mean, really, really wrong. I mean actually all wrong. However, I'm only really worrying, and more generally, as to the possible consequences for mathematics of using a formal logic thatwouldbe wrong.

This question is in fact quite difficult to assess. Nearly all mathematicians use in fact their logical intuition to prove theorems. Thus, they don't have to rely on any method of formal proof and thus it doesn't seem to matter that mathematical logic should be wrong. At the same time, most mathematicians probably receive a comprehensive training in formal logic, and I can indeed routinely spot problematic statements, presented as "obviously" true, being made by mathematicians when they discuss formal logic questions, suggesting that their logical sense may be wrongly affected by their formal logic training. Yet, I'm not sure whether that actually affects the proof mathematicians produce in their personal work.

It seems to me it's inevitable that it does. I know of specific proofs that are wrong in the sense that it's not something humans would normally accept. Mathematicians who accept them are obviously affected by their training in formal logic. However, these are proofs of logical formulas, not of mathematical theorems and these are much more difficult to assess in this respect.

Yet, even if it is the case that actual proofs done by mathematicians using their intuition are wrongly affected by their training in formal logic, I'm still not clear what could be the consequences of that in practical term.

One possible method to assess the possible consequences would be to compare proofs obtained using different methods of mathematical logic, such as relevance logics, intuitionistic logics, paraconsistent logics etc. However, I can't find examples of mathematical theorems proved using these methods. Further, all these methods are weaker than standard, "classical", mathematical logic, meaning that they deem valid a smaller number of logical implications and therefore, presumably, would end up with a smaller subset of the theorems currently accepted by mathematicians. Which may be good or bad but how do we know which?

EB