View Poll Results: In your personal opinion, do you feel that "If I am immortal, then I will soon die" is val

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Thread: If I am immortal, then I will soon die

  1. Top | #11
    Mazzie Daius fromderinside's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by fromderinside View Post
    So how does personal opinion rise (...)
    I read it all.
    EB

    EDIT
    Thanks for casting your vote.
    Thank you Spikepigeon

    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post

    Intuition
    1. The faculty of knowing or understanding something without reasoning or proof.
    Nobody explained the reasoning motivating their votes, so it is fair to assume it is intuition.

    And if not, same thing, since at some point whatever we think inevitably comes down to intuition.
    First in response to your statements on intuition I have three, two Scientific and one Experimental Philosophical actually, articles attempting to frame material/experimental bases for the notion of intuition.

    Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ? https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5020639/

    Partial Abstract: Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon.
    Comment: I stopped there because it's a bit off topic and in my wheelhouse where they resort to the lowest form of validity, face validity = it looks good to me, in the set up for the article. A very bad sign.


    Intuition: A fundamental bridging constructin the behavioural sciences http://www.trans-techresearch.net/wp.../intuition.pdf

    Abstract: The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, tohealth. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition’s place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry
    Summary and Conclusions: As argued at the outset, within psychology the concept of intuition has until comparatively recently been regarded as scientifically weak and thus consigned to the fringes of the discipline. In this article, we have reviewed, albeit briefly, the considerable body of theory and research that has emerged over recent years, spanning a wide variety of domains of application including management and education. This research clearly demonstrates that the concept of intuition has emerged as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry, one that has important ramifications for education, personal, medical and organizational decision making, personnel selection and assessment, team dynamics, training and organizational development. Recent theory and research point to clear differences between insight and intuition and to the role of intuition as an antecedent of creativity (rather than earlier views in which intuition was conflated with insight and creativity). A much clearer picture is now also emerging of the roles that implicit learning, tacit knowledge, pattern recognition and expertise play in intuitive judgment.These developments notwithstanding, we have argued that there is a need for further advancement of our understanding of intuition in terms of its underlying somatic, affective and cognitive components. In particular, there is a pressing need to understand more fully how these various components are integrated. Recent advances in dual-process theory have been highlighted as an important vehicle for this purpose,but several problems with this body of work have also been identified that need to be resolved in taking intuition research forward within a dual-process formulation.Finally, we have raised a number of measurement and related methodological issues arising from an over-reliance on psychometrically weak self report measures and called for the adoption of other, more direct approaches to the assessment of intuitive episodes and intuitive judgments. Several potentially profitable ways forward as a means of resolving these issues have been suggested. The conceptual clarity and compelling architecture that recent advances in dual-process theory provide have set the stage for a resurgence of inquiry into a construct that has the potential to contribute to a unified account of psychological functioning, across a wide range of domains of application,
    Comment: essentially failing to find material correlates leads these researchers to fall back of a vaguely framed dual process theory, which IMHO is just inserting another intervening variable to provide frame for the intervening variable they pursue.

    Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc...=rep1&type=pdf

    Abstract: Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First,evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition.
    Conclusion: A full account of expertise in philosophy will require much more experimental data comparing philosophers to genuine experts of other fields. The framework provided by this paper is offered to help achieve this goal. Yet it is also perhaps no coincidence that the research conducted thus far points to well-known failures and limitations of expertise.Many results taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by genuine expertise. Such results also provide a promising new approach for understanding philosophical expertise and activity. In cataloguing when professional intuitions are likely to be wrong, we may be able to increase our confidence in their expertise, in the intuitional reliability, which experimental methods in psychology and cognitive science can help to reveal and address. Attending to these limitations and turning to those empirical methods not only helps us begin to approximate philosophical expertise and activity, but can help us do philosophy even better in the future
    Comment: At least the experimental philosophers admit they don't have the expertise to frame the questions surrounding intuition.


    Actually for readers it comes down to trying to make sense of a nonsensical statement so they can respond. Else, as suggested by the very few who have responded here, such an effort didn't seem worth the effort required.

    You could have attempted to structure the question more appropriately into parts leading through some rational set of propositions to the contrast you made in a single meaningless statement. I conclude as I did that it was meaningless because of the evidence provided by respondents of 'not valid' in the questionnaire provided with the statement.

  2. Top | #12
    Contributor Speakpigeon's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by DBT View Post
    I can't see any way for it to be valid. Maybe it's a trick question.
    Come to think about it, the only immortals I know of are our "Académiciens" here in France, of the Académie française, the institution in charge of the French language, providing proper definitions to news words and all that. They happen to be called, no kidding, the "immortals".

    And of course, when they join the Académie, they are usually rather closer to their last breath than most, and it is true that once they are immortals, they will soon die. QED.

    So, yeah, you must have been right, that was a trick question!
    EB

  3. Top | #13
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    It is not intuition or personal opinion. It is mutual excursive. A logical falacy.

    Black and white. hot and cold, heavy and lite, big and small, flammable and non flammable, immortal and mortal are mutually exclusive conditions that can not both be true at the same time.

    a = immortal
    !a = mortal

    (a & !a) always evaluates as logically false. Expressing a proposition as formal logic and testing for true or false should always work.

  4. Top | #14
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    There is two senses of "immortal". In one sense, an immortal being is one that always will be, like the abrahamic God. In another, an immortal being is merely one that doesn't age and die of natural causes, but can still be assassinated and maybe die in a freak accident - like Dracula who lives forever unless someone drives a silver spike through his heart (or presumably if he's hit right in the chest by a meteorite with high silver content).

    If we interpret "immortal" in the Dracula sense, "soon" in astronomical timescales, and "will" as an expression of probable futures rather than certainty, than it has a reading where it is not wrong: even a one in a million chance of dying per year implies a less than one percent chance of surviving 5 million years, and an utterly negligible chance of surviving 50 million.

    It would though still be pragmatically odd without at least an "Even if...", since the immortality merely fails to make the consequent false but doesn't cause it.

  5. Top | #15
    Contributor Speakpigeon's Avatar
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    When we interpret arguments, we go for the proximate definition.

    This is exactly what nearly everybody who commented did.

    The first definition given by dictionaries is as follows:

    immortal
    1. not subject to death or decay; having perpetual life
    Any other definition is equivocation.

    This definition makes the argument invalid.

    I also don't understand how the question could possibly not make sense when most people who commented and voted seem to have understood it perfectly.
    EB

  6. Top | #16
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    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post
    When we interpret arguments, we go for the proximate definition.

    This is exactly what nearly everybody who commented did.

    The first definition given by dictionaries is as follows:

    immortal
    1. not subject to death or decay; having perpetual life
    Any other definition is equivocation.

    This definition makes the argument invalid.

    I also don't understand how the question could possibly not make sense when most people who commented and voted seem to have understood it perfectly.
    EB
    Dracula is not subject to death or decay. The definition is vague enough to match both readings.

  7. Top | #17
    Contributor Speakpigeon's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by fromderinside View Post

    Thank you Spikepigeon

    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post

    Intuition
    1. The faculty of knowing or understanding something without reasoning or proof.
    Nobody explained the reasoning motivating their votes, so it is fair to assume it is intuition.

    And if not, same thing, since at some point whatever we think inevitably comes down to intuition.
    First in response to your statements on intuition I have three, two Scientific and one Experimental Philosophical actually, articles attempting to frame material/experimental bases for the notion of intuition.

    Intuition and Insight: Two Processes That Build on Each Other or Fundamentally Differ? https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5020639/

    Partial Abstract: Intuition and insight are intriguing phenomena of non-analytical mental functioning: whereas intuition denotes ideas that have been reached by sensing the solution without any explicit representation of it, insight has been understood as the sudden and unexpected apprehension of the solution by recombining the single elements of a problem. By face validity, the two processes appear similar; according to a lay perspective, it is assumed that intuition precedes insight. Yet, predominant scientific conceptualizations of intuition and insight consider the two processes to differ with regard to their (dis-)continuous unfolding. That is, intuition has been understood as an experience-based and gradual process, whereas insight is regarded as a genuinely discontinuous phenomenon.
    Comment: I stopped there because it's a bit off topic and in my wheelhouse where they resort to the lowest form of validity, face validity = it looks good to me, in the set up for the article. A very bad sign.


    Intuition: A fundamental bridging constructin the behavioural sciences http://www.trans-techresearch.net/wp.../intuition.pdf

    Abstract: The concept of intuition has, until recently, received scant scholarly attention within and beyond the psychological sciences, despite its potential to unify a number of lines of inquiry. Presently, the literature on intuition is conceptually underdeveloped and dispersed across a range of domains of application, from education, to management, tohealth. In this article, we clarify and distinguish intuition from related constructs, such as insight, and review a number of theoretical models that attempt to unify cognition and affect. Intuition’s place within a broader conceptual framework that distinguishes between two fundamental types of human information processing is explored. We examine recent evidence from the field of social cognitive neuroscience that identifies the potential neural correlates of these separate systems and conclude by identifying a number of theoretical and methodological challenges associated with the valid and reliable assessment of intuition as a basis for future research in this burgeoning field of inquiry
    Summary and Conclusions: As argued at the outset, within psychology the concept of intuition has until comparatively recently been regarded as scientifically weak and thus consigned to the fringes of the discipline. In this article, we have reviewed, albeit briefly, the considerable body of theory and research that has emerged over recent years, spanning a wide variety of domains of application including management and education. This research clearly demonstrates that the concept of intuition has emerged as a legitimate subject of scientific inquiry, one that has important ramifications for education, personal, medical and organizational decision making, personnel selection and assessment, team dynamics, training and organizational development. Recent theory and research point to clear differences between insight and intuition and to the role of intuition as an antecedent of creativity (rather than earlier views in which intuition was conflated with insight and creativity). A much clearer picture is now also emerging of the roles that implicit learning, tacit knowledge, pattern recognition and expertise play in intuitive judgment.These developments notwithstanding, we have argued that there is a need for further advancement of our understanding of intuition in terms of its underlying somatic, affective and cognitive components. In particular, there is a pressing need to understand more fully how these various components are integrated. Recent advances in dual-process theory have been highlighted as an important vehicle for this purpose,but several problems with this body of work have also been identified that need to be resolved in taking intuition research forward within a dual-process formulation.Finally, we have raised a number of measurement and related methodological issues arising from an over-reliance on psychometrically weak self report measures and called for the adoption of other, more direct approaches to the assessment of intuitive episodes and intuitive judgments. Several potentially profitable ways forward as a means of resolving these issues have been suggested. The conceptual clarity and compelling architecture that recent advances in dual-process theory provide have set the stage for a resurgence of inquiry into a construct that has the potential to contribute to a unified account of psychological functioning, across a wide range of domains of application,
    Comment: essentially failing to find material correlates leads these researchers to fall back of a vaguely framed dual process theory, which IMHO is just inserting another intervening variable to provide frame for the intervening variable they pursue.

    Intuition Fail: Philosophical Activity and the Limits of Expertise http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc...=rep1&type=pdf

    Abstract: Experimental philosophers have empirically challenged the connection between intuition and philosophical expertise. This paper reviews these challenges alongside other research findings in cognitive science on expert performance and argues for three claims. First,evidence taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by the well researched failures and limitations of genuine expertise. Second, studying the failures and limitations of experts across many fields provides a promising research program upon which to base a new model of philosophical expertise. Third, a model of philosophical expertise based on the limitations of genuine experts may suggest a series of constraints on the reliability of professional philosophical intuition.
    Conclusion: A full account of expertise in philosophy will require much more experimental data comparing philosophers to genuine experts of other fields. The framework provided by this paper is offered to help achieve this goal. Yet it is also perhaps no coincidence that the research conducted thus far points to well-known failures and limitations of expertise.Many results taken to challenge philosophical expertise may also be explained by genuine expertise. Such results also provide a promising new approach for understanding philosophical expertise and activity. In cataloguing when professional intuitions are likely to be wrong, we may be able to increase our confidence in their expertise, in the intuitional reliability, which experimental methods in psychology and cognitive science can help to reveal and address. Attending to these limitations and turning to those empirical methods not only helps us begin to approximate philosophical expertise and activity, but can help us do philosophy even better in the future
    Comment: At least the experimental philosophers admit they don't have the expertise to frame the questions surrounding intuition.


    Actually for readers it comes down to trying to make sense of a nonsensical statement so they can respond. Else, as suggested by the very few who have responded here, such an effort didn't seem worth the effort required.

    You could have attempted to structure the question more appropriately into parts leading through some rational set of propositions to the contrast you made in a single meaningless statement. I conclude as I did that it was meaningless because of the evidence provided by respondents of 'not valid' in the questionnaire provided with the statement.
    Read again:

    Intuition
    1. The faculty of knowing or understanding something without reasoning or proof.
    To prove theorems, mathematicians typically use their intuition. To prove a theorem, mathematicians have to guess, literally, what possibly valid conclusion there is even before they are in a position to produce a formal proof that it is valid.

    Some formal proofs are so long and complex that the probability that mathematicians just stumble by chance on a valid conclusion is too small to explain that mathematicians routinely find valid conclusions.

    Conjectures in particular are interesting since they are admitted by most mathematicians, sometimes for a very long period of time, even though no formal proof is available. The fact that some conjectures get successfully formally proven proves beyond any reasonable doubt that mathematicians are capable of guessing valid conclusions. Many well-known mathematicians routinely talk of the importance of intuition in their work. I don't think anyone needs more empirical evidence than that.
    EB

  8. Top | #18
    Contributor Speakpigeon's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Jokodo View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post
    When we interpret arguments, we go for the proximate definition.

    This is exactly what nearly everybody who commented did.

    The first definition given by dictionaries is as follows:

    immortal
    1. not subject to death or decay; having perpetual life
    Any other definition is equivocation.

    This definition makes the argument invalid.

    I also don't understand how the question could possibly not make sense when most people who commented and voted seem to have understood it perfectly.
    EB
    Dracula is not subject to death or decay. The definition is vague enough to match both readings.
    You are contradicting yourself.

    It has to be significant that the only one to find that the question doesn't make sense is also the one who has a training in mathematical logic.
    EB

  9. Top | #19
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    Quote Originally Posted by Speakpigeon View Post
    Quote Originally Posted by Jokodo View Post

    Dracula is not subject to death or decay. The definition is vague enough to match both readings.
    You are contradicting yourself.

    It has to be significant that the only one to find that the question doesn't make sense is also the one who has a training in mathematical logic.
    EB
    Not at all.

    The argument expressed by the most prominent reading of your sentences is clearly invalid, I concur with everyone else insofar.

    But your exposition is ambiguous in multiple ways - in whatsense of immortality we have in mind, in whether we read the future tense as destined reality or probabilistic modality, in the standard of comparison for the intrinsically vague term "soon". Most of the arguments you get by specifying those variables are indeed invalid, many result in a contradiction. Given enough context though, there could even be a causal link: if there's a manhunt by mortals for the undead and you've been taken captive on suspicion of being one of them, you could very well say exactly what you gave us while waiting for the test results. Since you haven't specified any one particular argument, asking whether it, the argument, is valid makes no sense.

    The difference isn't that im trained in mathematical logic (I'm not, beyond high school level, and picking up little bits here and there where they became relevant), the difference is that im keyed to detecting linguistic ambiguity.

  10. Top | #20
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    More generally, when two people disagree about whether sentence A implies sentence B, it will always never be a disagreement about whether proposition P implies proposition Q, almost always a disagreement about the interpretation(s) of the sentences.

    Trying to deduce anything about logic without even as much as trying to clarify exactly what propositions your subjects gave the sentences in the process of evaluating your examples is bound to be fruitless.

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